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This guy would miss a fart in an elevator if City Hall ordered him to... CPS Inspector General's Report continues bashing lower ranking workers while covering up for top officials

If the latest CPS Inspector General's Report is to be believed, more than 98 percent of all the misconduct in Chicago's public schools come from teachers, principals, assistant principals, and other people in the schools, and there is virtually no misconduct (or even "ethics violations") by the thousands of people working in the CPS central and area offices.

And the biggest single problems facing Chicago's public schools?

"Pornography" and residency fraud.

By the March 25, 2009 meeting of the Chicago Board of Education (above), newly appointed CEO Ron Huberman was creating dozens of executive level jobs without submitting the appointments through reports to the public meetings of the Chicago Board of Education. Because Board members (including Peggy Davis, above) regularly voted to maintain the secrecy of the closed sessions of the Board (which they have done since 1995 when Mayor Daley was given control over the schools), the public has no way of knowing whether the dozens of expensive new hires that Huberman made were ever reported to the members of the Board. Huberman also redefined some of the most important executive jobs at CPS so that he could hire unqualified people from his colleagues at the Chicago Transit Authority and elsewhere without having to require that they had any training, certification or experience in public education. Most notably were those hired in the so-called "Office of Performance Management," which the Board allowed Huberman to create at a cost of $20 million during a time when Huberman and the Board claimed it was facing a $475 million "deficit." The Inspector General for more than 15 years has ignored all complaints about ethics violations or misconduct on the part of the top clout-heavy executives at CPS (and the members of the Board of Education) except to ensure that potential whistle blowers were silenced. Substance photo by George N. Schmidt.A cursory reading of the annual IG report shows that once again the Inspector General is ignoring violations of ethics codes and the law by members of the Chicago Board of Education and by top officials of CPS, while focusing obsessively in a secret-police like approach to the infractions of the lowest-ranking people in the system.

The complete report is printed below below. The report was originally republished here for Substance readers on December 22, 2009, without reformatting, and has been reformatted to fit the parameters of www.substancenews.new as of 6:00 a.m. on December 23, 2009. The words reproduced below are the words in the IG report, which can be found at the CPS Webside in PDF format. As Substance has previously reported, during the three years before CPS sued this reporter and Substance for $1.4 million for "copyright infringement", the Inspector General employed a corrupt former Sheriff's Deputy named Lemuel Hogue whose main job was to try and find dirt on me. Additionally, in February 1999, Paul Vallas and Gery Chico hired an outside attorney (Frederick Bates) to do an additional investigation against me at Bowen High School, where I had taught and performed other duties prior to being suspended for the publication of the CASE tests in 1999. At the time, and since, it became clear that the OIG ("Office of Inspector General") has been used by the Board and the "Chief Executive Officer" to investigate critics of the Board, but never to investigate the CEO, those with clout with the CEO or City Hall, or members of the Board of Education.

Since 1999, as I've reported to friends and colleagues on a number of occasions, as well as to the readers of Substance, I've seen no reason to take anything that comes out of the Office of the Inspector General seriously. The office is one of the more corrupt in Chicago — and that's saying something. The latest OIG report is typical. Although there are a couple of high-level investigations, most of the resources of the OIG were spent during fiscal 2009 (July 1, 2008 through June 30, 2009) on investigations into "corruption" at the local schools level. During the final years of the Duncan administration and the first year of the Huberman administration, the number of illegal, unethical, or questionable practices at the top increased dramatically, but were ignored by the OIG. For example, at the present time, the Board of Education routinely approves no-bid contracts for a range of goods and services, with virtually no oversight. Additionally, obviously corrupt contractors (as reported to www.substancenews.net by Gerald Bracey, for example) such as the "Save-A-Life Foundation" (SALF) and the corrupt relationship between that contractor and former CEO Arne Duncan are simply ignored. See "News Delayed is News Denied: The Skelton in Arne Duncan's closet" by Gerald W. Bracey [http://www.substancenews. net/articles.php? page=1009§ion=Article].

A more dramatic and far reaching example of misconduct, if not (yet) outright fraud, involves the no-bid contracts which have completely undermined the integrity of the Board of Education's payroll management systems.

Beginning in 2007 and continuing to the present, CPS has been unable to provide the Chicago Teachers Pension Fund (CTPF) with an accurate and precise accounting of the payroll records of thousands of retiring teachers who are to be paid pensions. Because of this failure (unprecedented in Chicago history), after two years of delays, CTPF sued the Board of Education to resolve the problem in July 2009. By that time, three years' of teacher pensions had been in limbo in one form or another because of the outsourcing of the CPS payroll computer systems. Additional problems, some documented by Substance here at substancenews.net and in print, have also been uncovered in the CPS financial systems. See for example, the ridiculous compromise of the CPS "Position File" (the data that once tracked the payroll of every full-time and part-time employee of the largest employer in Illinois). As a result of the compromise of the CPS financial and payroll data systems (the direct result of outsourcing), CPS provided Substance (under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act, FOIA) with a supposed "Position File" which listed 530 individuals as being paid more than the CEO (who is currently budgeted to be paid $230,000 for FY 2010, plus an undisclosed bonus). As a result of an examination by Substance and members of CORE's Budget Study Committee, Substance published one report on the problems with the Position File as "The Millionaire List" [see http://www.substancenews. net/articles.php?page= 920§ion=Article]. When the same information was provided by Substance to the Chicago Teachers Union and then provided to the Chicago Sun-Times, the CPS response was that the positions budgeted above $230,000 per year were a so-called "bucket" to hold large amounts of payroll dollars for other uses. Trouble with the explanation was, someone at CPS had entered the names of 530 individuals, a large number of whom are retired principals, into the CPS payroll data system, deliberately and without further explanation. Although the Sun-Times used the "explanation" as an excuse to kill any story based on the Position File, the explanation raised even more questions about the problems with CPS financial system. The OIC report ignores all of these problems.

The corruption and incompetence that had come to characterize the administration of former CEO Arne Duncan did not end with Duncan's appointment by President Obama as U.S. Secretary of Education under Duncan's successor, Ron Huberman. If anything Huberman immediately expanded it.

To take just one ongoing example of what the Inspector General misses. Beginning in February 2009 and continuing through December 16, 2009, the new CEO, Ron Huberman, appointed dozens of people to executive offices in CPS, some at salaries in excess of $100,000 per year, without making public Board Reports on these appointments or placing any of them into the public record.

The creation and expansion of the "Office of Performance Management" since February 2009 (at a cost of more than $20 million during a year when CPS supposedly has a "deficit" of $475 million) was almost completely done off the public record. For every "Performance Management" person Huberman employed and issued a Board Report on, he hired a dozen, all of them without any teaching experience or credentials in education. Those people are now working at salaries higher than those earned by teachers not only in the central office, but in all of the system's "Area Offices." Huberman also revised the qualifications for some of the most important executive jobs in the schools system without every publishing those to a Board meeting, allowing him to hire unqualified persons for the newly defined jobs of "Chief Area Officers." The Inspector General of the Chicago Board of Education somehow missed all that, but was able to catch about a dozen teachers, substitute teachers, assistant principals and principals accessing what he calls "pornography" on their Board computers.

One of the ongoing sources of problems with CPS expenses that is buried in the files of the Office of the Inspector General is the regular no-bid renewal of the $5 million annual contract to a corporation called "Transpar" to manage CPS busing program. Originally brought before the Board of Education by Paul Vallas (who served as CEO of CPS from 1995 to 2001), the outsourcing of busing management followed the usual pattern. A couple of articles were published in the Chicago Sun-Times about the alleged incompetence of the CPS employees who were managing the busing programs (at greatly reduced staff) and busing problems. The solution, as always, was to privatize the service. Within two years after the awarding of the first contract to manage the CPS busing programs to Transpar, the contract was being examined by the previous Inspector General. Her report was ignored by the Board of Education, despite serious questions about the ethics of the CEO in the entire process that has resulted in Transpar getting more than $50 million in contracts, almost all without bidding, since the program was first privatized more than a decade ago. Once again, an annual OIG report is issued with no mention of the busing contracts.

The CPS Inspector General works on orders from the top, both at City Hall and at CPS, and has been covering up for official misconduct at the top for the 15 years since Mayor Daley took over CPS. If he were in charge of monitoring air pollution, he'd try to ignore the smell of a fart in an elevator.

What follows is the complete report, dated December 16, 2009 and released, apparently, on December 21, 2009 without explanation for the delay from anyone at the Chicago Board of Education.

December 16, 2009 This Annual Report is being provided to the Chicago Board of Education and the Illinois General Assembly pursuant to the School Code of Illinois, specifically 105 ILCS 5/34-

13.1(e).

The School Code authorizes the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) for the Chicago Board of Education to conduct investigations into allegations of or incidents of waste, fraud, and financial mismanagement in public education within the jurisdiction of the Board. The OIG has also been charged with the responsibility of investigating allegations of various categories of employee misconduct.

This Annual Report is a summary of reports and investigations for Fiscal Year 2009, the period between July 1, 2008 and June 30, 2009. Other significant accomplishments that occurred in FY 2009 are also summarized.

The mission of the Office of the Inspector General is to ensure integrity in the operations of the Chicago Public Schools (“CPS”) by conducting meaningful, accurate and thorough investigations into allegations of waste, fraud, financial mismanagement and employee misconduct. The OIG also reviews CPS systems, practices and procedures to determine their efficacy in preventing waste, fraud and financial mismanagement.

The OIG would like to thank the Chicago Board of Education and CPS administration for continued cooperation and support and its usually rapid response to reports and recommendations issued by the OIG.

James M. Sullivan, Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General, Board of Education

Of The City of Chicago

James M. Sullivan

Inspector General

850 W. Jackson Boulevard, Suite 500

Chicago, Illinois 60607-3032

Telephone: (773) 534-9400

Fax: (773) 534-9401

E-mail: investigations@cps.k12.il.us

OIG Fiscal Year 2009 Annual Report

_______________________________________________________________________

ANNUAL REPORT

BUDGET

During Fiscal Year 2009, the Office of the Inspector General continued to perform its statutorily mandated function, despite continued budget and staffing constraints. In FY 2009, the OIG was allocated $1.8 million and was staffed with 17 full-time employees. Compared to oversight offices with similar responsibilities, the OIG is extremely underfunded and under-staffed. Despite these shortcomings, the OIG continues to conduct accurate, thorough and meaningful investigations resulting in increased integrity in CPS operations.

FISCAL YEAR 2009 COMPLAINTS RECEIVED, In FY 09, the OIG received 1210 complaints alleging misconduct, waste, fraud and financial mismanagement within the Chicago Public School system. This total represents the largest number of complaints received in a reporting year by the OIG. These complaints included allegations of misconduct by CPS employees or vendors and allegations of students residing outside the City of Chicago and attending CPS. As illustrated below, the OIG continues to receive complaints and initiate investigations on an increasing number of allegations each year. Complaints Received FY2001 - FY2009

[CHART IN ORIGINAL NOT REPRODUCED HERE FOR SUBSTANCE]

Complaints Received OIG Fiscal Year 2009 Annual Report

TRAINING. Many employees of the OIG are members of the Association of Inspectors General, a national organization of state, local and federal inspectors general and their staffs. The AIG offers training seminars and certification institutes for members as well as networking opportunities. Currently, five OIG employees have received the designation of Certified Inspector General after undergoing training by the AIG. Participation in the AIG also allows the OIG to be trained in best practices in the performance of the Inspector General function. Locally, the OIG collaborates with IG offices from other state and local agencies to train all staff in a variety of investigation and audit related areas.

INVESTIGATION STANDARDS. The OIG conducts its investigations in accordance with the Principles and Standards For Offices Of Inspector General, generally accepted principles, quality standards and best practices applicable to federal, state and local offices of inspectors general. In addition, the OIG, at all times, exercises due professional care in conducting its investigations and issuing its reports and recommendations.

FY 2009 UPDATES TO PREVIOUSLY REPORTED INVESTIGATIONS

Federal Charges for Charter School Theft. In FY 05, the OIG reported the results of an investigation that revealed that a charter school founder and principal charged more than $250,000 on the school’s credit card and used school funds to pay for questionable expenditures that included, more than $32,000 for general merchandise including purchases from Lord & Taylor, Marshall Field’s, Louis Vuitton, Meystel’s Fashion, Coach, Bloomingdales, Saks Fifth Avenue, Elan Furs, Tommy Hilfiger and the Sky Mall Airline Catalog; more than $2,000 in hair care and cosmetic products; $5,800 for jewelry, $329 for appetite suppression pills; more

than $18,000 in food and beverage expenses; $31,000 in expenditures for telephone and internet use; $71,000 in travel expenses; and hundreds of dollars in personal car repair expenses. The investigation also revealed that the principal commingled charter school funds with funds from another school in which she was involved and the principal made large disbursements to family members. Following the OIG report, the charter school agreement between CPS and the charter school was terminated. In FY 09, a grand jury impaneled by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois indicted the charter school principal for theft of charter school funds. The charges against the principal are pending. (3614)

OIG Fiscal Year 2009 Annual Report

Federal Criminal Convictions. In its FY 06 Annual Report, the OIG reported that a CPS contractor actually controlled a company that purported to be a certified minority business enterprise. The investigation determined that the majority-owned contractor controlled the MBE company and its work on a CPS sheltered market contract. In essence, the investigation revealed that employees of the majority-owned company prepared the MBE’s bid documents, handled invoicing for the MBE and had excessive control of the MBE’s business bank account, including transferring funds in and out of the MBE’s account. Following the OIG investigation, CPS debarred the majority-owned company, the MBE and another company involved in the contracting scam. The matter was referred to law enforcement and the majority-owned company owner and the MBE owner were both charged with the federal offense of mail fraud in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In FY 08, both the owner of the majority-owned company and the MBE owner plead guilty to mail fraud for their roles in the minority contracting scam. In FY 09, the majority-owned company owner was sentenced to serve 41 months in a federal penitentiary. The minority-owned company owner was sentenced to two years of probation with the first year of probation served as home confinement with electronic

home monitoring. (C294)

Fraudulent Purchasing Scheme. In FY 08, the OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that purchases of equipment by a central office department were orchestrated to circumvent Illinois law and Chicago Board of Education Rules and Policies concerning competitive bidding and Board approval of purchases. Specifically, a vendor orchestrated a scheme to reflect that the purchases of millions of dollars of equipment by CPS were purportedly made from ten separate vendors when in fact the purchases were made from the same vendor. In fact, the investigation revealed that one vendor created three other companies, purportedly run by his sister, a friend and another person, for the purpose of purporting to sell equipment to CPS. The scheming vendor also utilized six other vendors to sell equipment by simply using the vendors’ names and CPS vendor numbers on the purchases when in fact those purported suppliers did not perform any function in the transaction other than to send the scheming vendor the purchase orders and checks received from CPS in exchange for 3% of the purchase price.

In FY 09, based on the OIG investigation, CPS permanently debarred five of the vendors involved in the purchasing scheme from doing business with CPS and three other vendors were debarred for three years. (C349)

Payroll Case. In FY 08 the OIG reported on an investigation of a payroll fraud scheme involving nine CPS employees. The OIG investigation revealed that two employees assigned to the CPS Payroll Department fraudulently caused seven other employees to receive a total of least $141,285.64 in CPS funds to which they were not entitled. Specifically, the OIG OIG Fiscal Year 2009 Annual Report investigation revealed that a voucher coordinator assigned to the CPS Payroll Department fraudulently caused at least $120,129.74 in payroll checks to be issued to a high school teacher, an elementary school teacher, a financial specialist, and two school clerks to which they were not entitled. The OIG investigation further revealed that the voucher coordinator received kickbacks from the CPS employees in exchange for causing the fraudulent payroll checks to be issued in their names. The OIG investigation also revealed that the high school teacher received money which was subsequently given to the voucher coordinator as a kickback from the school clerk in exchange for payroll checks being issued in the school clerk’s name for CPS funds to which the clerk was not entitled. The OIG investigation additionally revealed that a payroll adjustment clerk fraudulently caused at least $21,155.90 in payroll checks to be issued to two school clerks to which they were not entitled. The OIG investigation further revealed that the payroll adjustment clerk received kickbacks from the school clerks in exchange for causing payroll checks to be issued in their names for CPS funds to which they were not entitled.

During the course of the investigation, the matter was referred to the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office for a criminal investigation. As a result of the joint investigation between the OIG and the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, nine CPS employees were indicted by a Cook County Circuit Court grand jury. The two payroll department employees were charged with being the organizers of a continuing financial crimes enterprise, a Class X felony, as well as numerous other charges. The seven employees who received bogus checks were charged with various counts of theft and theft of school and government property.

Additionally, in FY 09, the OIG identified the 9th and 10th CPS employees involved in the payroll fraud scheme. These investigations are summarized later in this report. The 10th employee involved in the scheme has also been indicted by a Cook County Grand Jury and charges against this former employee are pending.

In FY 09, nine of the employees involved in the payroll fraud scheme all plead guilty to theft charges. Sentences of the former employees ranged from 6 months to 4 years of probation. The voucher coordinator who orchestrated payments of more than $120,000 to the other employees and received money in return, in addition to a term of probation, was also sentenced to 6 months in the Cook County Department of Corrections. Most defendants have been ordered to pay restitution and to date, CPS has received, or will receive during their terms of probation, more than $120,000 in restitution from the defendants.

Homicide Investigation. In FY 08, the OIG conducted an investigation after learning that a high school teacher shot and killed her estranged husband. During the course of the investigation, the OIG learned that the teacher shot her estranged husband after an altercation in which the

teacher purportedly feared for her life. To date, criminal charges have not been filed against the teacher. The OIG investigation also revealed that the teacher had engaged in prior acts of violence and threats to co-workers. Based on the OIG investigation, CPS sought to terminate the teacher for, among other charges, the shooting of her estranged husband without justification. In FY 09, following an administrative hearing seeking the teacher’s dismissal, a hearing officer determined that there was no credible evidence to suggest that the teacher acted with any justification when she shot and killed her estranged husband and CPS proved this charge by a preponderance of the evidence. The hearing officer recommended that the teacher be dismissed. The Board adopted the hearing officer’s recommendation and the teacher was dismissed from CPS employment. (5695)

Debarment. In FY 08, the OIG reported on an investigation which revealed that a CPS vendor providing consulting services at various schools submitted falsified invoices to the schools which reflected dates and times that the vendor did not in fact work. Another investigation of the same vendor revealed that the vendor had a direct economic interest in a company as a partner while she was also a CPS employee, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. The OIG investigation also revealed that the vendor showed a lack of business integrity by doing work for CPS under the vendor number of another company to circumvent a CPS Department of Procurement and Contracts decision to suspend the vendor’s vendor number during the course of the previous OIG investigation. In FY 09, the vendor was debarred by CPS and is permanently banned from doing business with CPS. (C353, 6355)

FISCAL YEAR 2009 INVESTIGATIONS

In FY 09, the OIG issued 127 reports documenting investigations of alleged waste, fraud, financial mismanagement and employee misconduct. The OIG conducted numerous other investigations of allegations that did not reveal evidence of wrongdoing. Pursuant to the School Code of Illinois, 105 ILCS 5/34-13.1(e), the following are summaries of the OIG investigations for which reports were submitted in FY 09.

Former CPS Chief Purchasing Officer Heather Obora (above right) receives a "One Gallistel Not Three" tee shirt from the Gallistel Elementary School Principal at the May 22, 2008 facilities hearing at Morgan Park High School on the CPS facilities plans. In the far left in the photo above is Alderman John Pope (10th Ward), who at the time was supporting Gallistel but who since has been wavering in favor of "New Schools" projects. CPS continued to fail to provide the public with a facilities plan, despite approving nearly $1 billion on construction bonds during the past year. Gallistel is still spread over four buildings despite annual reminders to CPS of its enormous problems. Obora is no longer with CPS. Substance photo by George N. Schmidt.Purchasing Law and Rule Violations. The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a CPS Officer created a purchase order for $1.56 million payable to a company without the required approval by the Chicago Board of Education. The Officer, and other employees involved, also failed to subject the $1.56 million contract to competitive bidding, in violation of Section 105 ILCS 5/34-21.3 of the School Code of Illinois and Board Rule 5-4(a). The investigation further revealed that if the Officer, and employees involved, believed the contract was for a non-biddable item, they failed to obtain the required approval of the Board to pay the company for a non-biddable item in excess of $25,000, in violation of Board Rule 5-10; failed to request proposals/qualifications for a non-biddable item $250,001 and above, in violation of Board Rule 5-4.1(b); and/or failed to obtain the required approval of ¾ of the members of the Board for an emergency expenditure, in violation of Section 105 ILCS 5/10-20.21(xiv) of the School Code of Illinois and Board Rule 5-4(b)(xiv). In addition, the Officer, and other employees, failed to submit the $1.56 million contract to the CPS General Counsel for review prior to the execution of the contract, in violation of Board Rule 2-5.1. In addition to the significant law, rule and policy violations, the OIG investigation revealed that the failure to subject the $1.56 million project to competitive bidding likely caused CPS to pay $1 million, or almost 200%, more for the project than it cost. In essence, CPS wasted $1 million.

Following the investigation, and in conjunction with findings of another investigation which is detailed below, the OIG recommended that CPS terminate the Officer. Based solely on this investigation, the OIG recommended that CPS terminate another employee involved in the improper letting of the contract and excessive payments to the contractor. The OIG also recommended that CPS pursue all legal remedies to recoup some portion of the $1.56 million paid to contractor based on the fact that under Board Rule 5-13 the contract was void. The Officer subsequently resigned from CPS and was designated ineligible to be rehired. The other employee was terminated and has also been designated ineligible to be rehired. In addition, the CPS Law Department successfully negotiated with the contractor and the contractor returned $250,000 to CPS. (7146)

In another investigation involving the same CPS Officer, the OIG found significant violations of Board Rules and policies concerning payments to a vendor and bidding requirements. The investigation revealed that the Board authorized payments to a CPS contractor for a professional service contract not to exceed $30,000,000 during its five-year contract with CPS. However, as the investigation revealed, CPS paid the contractor $38,328,632.83 in less than five years and an additional $6,750,151.47 in funds, encumbered by three open purchase orders, remained available to pay the contractor when the OIG reported its findings.

In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that the CPS Officer acted with complete disregard for and in violation of Board Rules by requesting purchase orders totaling $20,772,015.47 in a one year period, and paying the contractor $14,081,874.52 during this same one-year period, far exceeding Board authority to pay the contractor. The investigation also revealed that an underling of the Officer violated Board Rules by approving 14 requisitions for purchase orders payable to the contractor, many of which exceeded Board authority to pay the contractor.

Based on a review of activities being engaged in by the contractor, the OIG found that CPS had purchased millions of dollars of equipment, a biddable item, through the contractor without subjecting the purchases to competitive bidding, in violation of Section 105 ILCS 5/34-21.3 of the School Code of Illinois and Board Rule 5-4(a). Further, CPS did not have a written contract with a sub-contractor, a supplier of the equipment, or any other entity engaged in the program to install the equipment, which, in the opinion of the OIG subjected CPS to numerous risks that would be minimized by a formal contractual relationship.

Following this investigation, the OIG recommended that the Officer, based on this investigation and the one mentioned above, be terminated. Further, the OIG recommended that CPS determine the appropriateness of continuing to pay the contractor since continuing to pay the contractor would cause CPS to continue to engage in violations of the School Code of Illinois and Board Rules. Also, the OIG recommended that CPS determine if it desires to continue the equipment installation program and, if so, seek approval of the program and expenditures related to the program through formal Board processes and subject the program and expenditures to all necessary internal controls and subject all future purchases of equipment to competitive bidding as required by the School Code of Illinois and Board Rules. Following the issuance of the OIG report containing its findings and recommendations, the Officer resigned from CPS employment and CPS implemented additional and necessary controls regarding the purchase of biddable items. (7300)

After advising CPS administration of the above findings, the OIG continued to investigate the contractual relationship between the contractor and CPS. Based on this investigation, the OIG reported additional findings, specifically:

o Payments to the contractor in excess of Board authority were necessitated by an increase in the scope of services that the contractor was asked to perform during its contract period with CPS and pass-through payments made to individuals who performed services for CPS unrelated to the services performed by the contractor.

o CPS failed to exercise appropriate and necessary contractor oversight of the contractor during the contract period which caused:

• excessive overpayments to the contractor without Board authority;

• a disincentive to the contractor to stay within the contractual compensation and reimbursement limits; and,

• consultants in the contractor’s hierarchy to determine sub-consultant rates of pay and approve other consultant’s invoices.

o The conduct of the contractor posed the risk of unethical conduct that CPS could better manage and control with a Contractor Code of Ethics.

o Increased reliance on the contractor to perform an escalating level of services for CPS enhanced the risk of decreased CPS control over and accountability for the program.

o A multiplier of 2.5 factored on the contractor’s labor rate, as well as the labor rate charged by many of the contractor’s sub-consultants, is unreasonable given the multitude of other accommodations and reimbursements afforded the contractor and its sub-consultants. This 2.5 markup alone accounted for more than $15,000,000 of payments to the contractor from October 2004 to January 2009.

o A program managed by the contractor and a sub-consultant expanded since 2004 and created additional costs charged by the contractor, however the program passed on unreasonable charges to CPS, including markups on student and mentor labor.

o Employees of a sub-consultant, who managed a program under the supervision of the contractor, were not subjected to criminal background checks despite being in direct, daily contact with CPS students, in violation of the School Code of Illinois (105 ILCS 5/34-18.5(f)).

Based on these findings, the OIG made the following recommendations:

1. CPS must ensure that all payments to the contractor that are pass-throughs to individuals and companies that do not perform services related to the agreement with the contractor are immediately stopped.

2. CPS must begin exercising appropriate and necessary management of the contractor, or any company subsequently performing a similar function, to ensure that services are provided within scope and within spending authorization.

3. CPS should determine the appropriate labor rates charged by consultants and subconsultants working on the contract.

4. CPS should enact a Contractor Code of Ethics which, at the very least, requires written CPS approval for a contractor to hire a relative of the company’s management team, especially a relative of identified key personnel; and requires contractor disclosure of any potential conflicts of interest that arise during the term of an engagement, specifically disclosure of any direct or indirect economic interest a consultant may have in relation to CPS or other members of the contractor’s management team.

5. CPS should establish appropriate wage markup provisions utilized by consultants that are specifically and transparently agreed to in contract documents and that are weighed against all other accommodations afforded to consultants by CPS.

6. CPS should reconsider the current structure of one of the programs managed by the contractor and a sub-consultant, and establish a more cost-effective mechanism to have those services performed, to ensure compliance with applicable procurement laws and rules and to mentor students. In addition, CPS should establish acceptable wage rates and markups charged by mentors and establish minimum certification and/or education requirements for mentors.

7. CPS should immediately require that all contractor and sub-consultant personnel who have direct daily contact with students be subjected to fingerprint based criminal background checks. (7300)

Failure to Pay Rent. In another revelation of waste and inefficiency, the OIG issued a report substantiating an allegation that a local elected public official occupied CPS owned property for

seven years after the termination of a lease of the property without paying rent or leasehold taxes. Specifically, the OIG found that the official occupied CPS owned property for more than 14 years pursuant to various leases with CPS. However, the OIG investigation revealed that since 2002, the official has occupied the property without a lease. In addition, the OIG found that CPS administration had acquiesced to the official’s tenancy of the property by failing to either enter into a new lease with the official or evict the official, thereby making the official a holdover tenant liable for the payment of rent to CPS at the rate of the last lease, $1,534.70 per month. Since the official had not paid rent to CPS for the period of time since the expiration of the lease

while still occupying the property, the official, at the time of the OIG report, owed CPS $74,914.80.

The OIG investigation further revealed that as a leaseholder of publicly owned property, the official has been responsible for the payment of leasehold taxes to Cook County for at least the last twenty years. At the time of the OIG report, these leasehold taxes totaled $157,526.76, with penalties for non-payment totaling $286,912.02. As such, leasehold taxes and penalties owed to Cook County by the official totaled $444,638.78.

Based on its investigation, the OIG recommended that CPS take immediate action to evict the official from CPS property, collect all rent owed to CPS by the official since the expiration of the lease, and seek all legal remedies to force the official to pay leasehold taxes owed to Cook County. (7504)

Misappropriation of Funds. The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an elementary school principal made unbridled purchases of more than $67,000.00 in photography

equipment with school funds over a two year period using a CPS credit card, purchase orders and school funds. In addition, more than $41,000.00 in equipment, including $17,000.00 in photography equipment and more than $24,000.00 in other technology equipment, could not be located at the school since being purchased during the two school years while the principal was in charge of the elementary school. The OIG investigation also revealed that the principal utilized school staff to do work on his personal photography during school hours and while the staff members were on duty with CPS; the principal received his full CPS salary for six days when he was in fact under contract with another school district to be a principal of an elementary school;

the principal engaged in the unauthorized use of sick time in that he utilized sick time with CPS while working for the other school district; and, the principal resided in Crete, Illinois, in violation of the CPS Residency Policy.

Based on its investigation, the OIG recommended that CPS should utilize all legal remedies to recoup $2,980.33 in CPS salary that the principal received for the six days when he was under contract with the other school district; that CPS should utilize all legal remedies to recoup $2,483.61 in sick pay that the principal received to which he was not entitled; and, that CPS should enact more stringent controls to monitor school-based purchases, made either through the purchase order process, via PCards or with payments from school internal accounts, to prevent principals from misdirecting school funds and making unbridled purchases of arguably unnecessary equipment and supplies.

Following the OIG investigation, the principal, who resigned during the course of the investigation, was designated ineligible to be rehired. (6955)

An OIG investigation revealed that a high school principal misappropriated school funds by allowing six non-teaching staff members, including two members of the Local School Council, to attend a four-day conference held in Las Vegas, Nevada, which was ostensibly for teachers and administrators. The investigation also revealed that the principal utilized more than $1,200.00 in school funds to pay for a non-teaching staff member to travel and stay in Las Vegas, Nevada purportedly to attend the conference for educators, yet the non-teaching staff member was not registered for the conference and did not ultimately attend any conference sessions. In addition, the principal failed to obtain approval to attend the conference by his department head. The principal was issued a five-day suspension. (7261)

Payroll Case. As reported above, in FY 08 the OIG investigated and reported a payroll fraud scheme involving nine CPS employees. The OIG investigation revealed that two employees assigned to the CPS Payroll Department fraudulently caused seven other employees to receive a total of at least $141,285.64 in CPS funds to which they were not entitled. In FY 09, the OIG identified another school clerk as also being a participant in the payroll fraud scheme. The OIG investigation of the school clerk revealed that in this same payroll scheme, a voucher coordinator assigned to the CPS Payroll Department fraudulently caused at least $13,618.27 in gross CPS payroll checks to be issued to the school clerk to which she was not entitled. The school clerk was terminated from CPS employment and was designated ineligible to be rehired. Criminal charges against the clerk are pending. (6610)

An elementary school teacher also took part in the payroll scheme and the OIG investigation revealed that a voucher coordinator assigned to the CPS Payroll Department fraudulently caused at least $16,846.40 in CPS payroll checks to be issued to the teacher to which she was not entitled. The teacher resigned and was designated ineligible to be rehired. The teacher plead guilty to criminal charges and was sentenced to serve a term of 12 months of probation and was ordered to pay $3,000 restitution to CPS. (6610)

Stringing Purchases to Avoid Internal Controls. The OIG reviewed the procurement of city-wide equipment repair services by a central office department for compliance with purchasing rules put forth in the School Code of Illinois and Board Rules. The OIG review produced the following findings:

o For five fiscal years, the central office department in charge of the services opened aggregate purchase orders in excess of $13 million and issued purchase orders to vendors that: did not have contracts with CPS; were not required to have liability insurance; had not engaged in a competitive process to obtain work with CPS in amounts exceeding dollar thresholds that require competitive bidding; and, were not required to establish their qualifications or provide licenses to CPS.

o For five fiscal years, the central office department issued purchase orders to more than thirty vendors per year, in aggregate amounts in excess of $10,000, without subjecting the awards to competitive bidding, contrary to Board Rules which require competitive bidding and Board approval.

o For five fiscal years, the central office department had issued purchase orders to about two dozen vendors per year, in aggregate amounts in excess of $25,000, without subjecting the awards to competitive bidding, contrary to the School Code of Illinois.

o The central office department erroneously treated as emergency services work that was clearly foreseeable and for which the department should have anticipated and planned.

o A second central office department improperly removed controls from a budget line allowing the central office department procuring the repair services to open aggregate purchase orders for individual vendors in excess of established dollar thresholds requiring contracts and competitive bidding.

o The lack of necessary controls on expenditures for the equipment repair services, which average $2.7 million annually, unnecessarily increased the risk of overbilling, fraudulent payments, and other types of employee and vendor misconduct. Based on its review, the OIG recommended that the central office department, in conjunction with other central office departments involved in internal controls, develop a process by which the equipment repair could be accomplished in a timely fashion and in a manner consistent with current procurement law and Board Rules.

Specifically, the OIG recommended the following:

o That CPS determines, through a five-year sampling, the nature of the equipment repair services required and the cost of such services. Based on this information, the central office department should be able to specifically identify the nature of its annual equipment repair needs and the costs associated with these services.

o The central office department should prepare a Request for Qualifications (“RFQ”) seeking vendors that are able to perform one or more of the equipment repair services identified by the department, with prices for each type of repair service identified.

o The RFQ should require that responders have the appropriate insurance for vendors who perform the equipment repair and appropriate certifications and/or licenses associated with the specific aspects of the equipment repair services.

o Upon receiving the RFQ responses, the central office department should prequalify vendors meeting the requirements of the RFQ that are willing and able to perform the services required at established rates based on a review of the previous five fiscal years of such services.

o Board approval of the RFQ and the pre-qualification pool.

o A formal evaluation process to rate vendors who perform the equipment repair services on behalf of CPS with established benchmarks and ensure that such benchmarks are met. The central office department should regularly review such evaluations to determine whether the vendor should remain as a pre-qualified vendor. The evaluation process should include a regular review of the frequency of use of each vendor to identify any hint of favoritism in the recurring use of any vendor(s).

As a result of the OIG investigation, the central office department has begun the processes recommended by the OIG which would establish the necessary controls on the large expenditure of CPS funds. (7771)

OIG Warning to P-Card Users. In response to a 2008 Illinois Supreme Court decision (People v. Howard, 228 Ill.2d 428, 885 N.E.2d 85) affirming the propriety of criminal charges and the conviction of a public employee who used a government issued credit card for personal use despite the fact that the employee paid the money back when the credit card bill came due, the OIG issued a memorandum containing recommendations advising CPS administration to issue additional warnings to employees who are issued CPS corporate credit cards.

The OIG recommendations included:

1. That a proposed CPS Policy regarding Procurement Cards include a warning that misuse of a P-Card, in addition to disciplinary action, also subjects the employee to criminal charges even if the employee reimburses CPS for the personal charges, and,

2. That all P-Card users, approvers, and reviewers be routinely and specifically reminded that use of the P-Card for personal or non-CPS related purposes may subject the individual to the criminal charge of Official Misconduct which carries a penalty of two to five years of imprisonment and which, upon conviction, will lead to the forfeiture of one’s CPS pension.

Payroll Department Recommendations. The OIG conducted an investigation after it learned that the Department of Payroll Services incorrectly processed a direct deposit authorization form submitted by an employee which resulted in four payroll checks of another employee with a similar name being deposited into the bank account of the employee who filed the direct deposit authorization form. During the course of its review, the OIG also learned of another incorrectly processed direct deposit authorization form which resulted in an employee’s paycheck being deposited in another employee’s bank account. The OIG investigation further revealed that the erroneous processing of the direct deposit authorization forms was not the result of fraudulent activity but the result of a lack of specific procedures to be followed in the processing of direct deposit authorization forms and a lack of any attention to detail in the processing of those forms by a Department of Payroll Services employee and interns. Based on the investigation,

the OIG recommended the following:

o That CPS act as quickly as possible to ensure that a self-service link on PeopleSoft allowing employees to personally enroll in payroll direct deposit, or to change their direct deposit designation, is operational.

o That, until the time that PeopleSoft self-service link with regards to direct deposit is operational, the Department of Payroll Services enact specific procedures outlining all of the steps to be taken to ensure that the inputted direct deposit information corresponds to the appropriate employee.

o That, until the time that a PeopleSoft self-service link with regards to direct deposit is operational, CPS re-draft the Authorization for Direct Deposit or Pay Card Form to require additional personal identification information to ensure that the inputted direct deposit information corresponds to the appropriate employee. (7054)

Failure to Cooperate with the OIG. In FY 07, a Board Rule was enacted by the Chicago Board of Education that codifies current case law and further warns employees of their specific duties regarding administrative investigations conducted by the OIG. Board Rule 4-4m obligates all CPS employees to cooperate with the OIG during its investigations. Specifically, all employees interviewed by the OIG who are advised of “Administrative Rights” may not refuse to answer questions based upon the assertion of that employee’s privilege against self-incrimination. Any employee who refuses to answer questions during an interview with the OIG after receiving a notice of administrative rights shall be considered flagrantly insubordinate and to have grossly disrupted the educational process within the meaning of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. Any employee who refuses to answer questions posed by the OIG, after receipt of a notice of administrative rights, shall be subject to dismissal from employment.

The OIG conducted an investigation following the issuance of a Warning Resolution to a high school teacher who, in FY 08, had failed to cooperate with the OIG and answer questions following his arrest for possession of a controlled substance. During this second investigation, the teacher again refused to answer questions by investigators from the OIG regarding certain details surrounding his arrest for the offenses of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and possession of cannabis, after being advised of administrative rights, in violation of Board Rule 4-4(m) and contrary to the directives for improvement contained within the Warning Resolution. Based on his continued failure to cooperate with the OIG and his actions in contradiction of the directives contained in the Warning Resolution, the OIG recommended that the teacher be terminated. CPS subsequently terminated the teacher for failure to cooperate with the OIG. (7069)

An OIG investigation revealed that a high school teacher was arrested and charged with the offenses of public indecency, resisting arrest, and violating the Chicago Park District Code. During an interview with the OIG, the teacher refused to answer questions by OIG investigators regarding certain details surrounding his arrest after being advised of administrative rights, in violation of Board Rule 4-4(m), the School Code of Illinois and the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The teacher subsequently plead guilty to misdemeanor charges and was sentenced to 12 months conditional discharge and 100 hours of community service. After a hearing before the Illinois State Board of Education, the teacher’s termination for failure to cooperate with the OIG, as well as other violations, was upheld. (7293)

Ethics Violations. The OIG conducted an investigation of a school clerk assistant assigned to an elementary school which revealed that the school clerk utilized confidential information regarding a former CPS employee for her own personal use and not in the performance of her official duties and responsibilities, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. (6713)

An OIG investigation revealed that a high school assistant principal supervised his sister who was hired as a school security officer at the high school, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. (6851)

The OIG conducted an investigation of a member of a high school local school council who was a former CPS employee on a miscellaneous payroll. The OIG investigation revealed that the LSC member solicited and received $100.00 from a teacher assigned to the high school, purportedly for her attendance at a principal orientation training seminar for prospective principals, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. Additionally, during the course of the investigation, the LSC member failed to appear in response to a subpoena issued by the Office of the Inspector General, in violation of the School Code of Illinois. The OIG recommended that the LSC member be removed from his position on the local school council, pursuant to Board Rule 6-29. Additionally, the OIG also recommended that CPS place a do not hire (“DNH”) on the CPS personnel records of the former CPS employee. (7672)

Misuse of Grant Funds.. The OIG conducted an investigation of an allegation that grant funds received by a central office department were misappropriated and that the funds were used to buy items, including iPods, for staff members. The OIG investigation revealed that the central office department purchased fifty-eight iPods utilizing Title II, Part D, Enhancing Education Through Technology grant funds, and many of the iPods were not utilized for purposes consistent with the grant. The OIG investigation further revealed that at least sixteen of these fifty-eight iPods purchased by the central office department remained unaccounted for at the time of the investigation. The OIG investigation also revealed that the central office department’s records regarding the distribution and current whereabouts of the iPods were not maintained in accordance with the grant agreement and best practices. Based on the investigation, the OIG recommended that CPS conduct periodic audits of CPS departments that are awarded grant funds to ensure that grant funds are being utilized consistently with the grant and that equipment purchased pursuant to a grant is utilized consistently with the objectives and guidelines of the grant. The OIG also recommended that CPS ensure that the central office department in question adopt inventory procedures to ensure that the in-take and distribution of all property purchased by and distributed by the department is accurately documented. (6400)

The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school teacher which revealed that for a period of nine months, the teacher utilized $10,000 of grant money awarded to the school for his personal use, in violation of the Constitution of Illinois, the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education and the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The OIG investigation also revealed that the teacher obtained and accepted secondary employment with at least four local colleges and universities without first notifying the CPS Ethics Officer, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. The teacher was subsequently issued a warning resolution. (6854)

Falsification of Attendance Records. An OIG investigation revealed that a custodial worker assigned to an elementary school falsified his attendance records on several occasions in that he swiped-in at another school because he was running late in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The custodial worker was terminated from CPS employment. (6915)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a school security aide at a high school swiped in a teacher on numerous occasions when the teacher was not at the school working. The OIG investigation also revealed that the teacher was excessively tardy, in that on numerous occasions she arrived at school after her scheduled start time of 8:00 a.m. and on some occasions arrived after the start time of her first class at 8:44 a.m. The OIG investigation further revealed that the teacher made a false statement during an interview with the OIG. All of these activities by the teacher and security aide were contrary to the CPS Employee Discipline and Due

Process Policy. Following the OIG investigation, the teacher was terminated from CPS employment and designated as ineligible to be rehired and the security aide retired from CPS in lieu of termination. (6602)

After receiving complaints alleging that an elementary school lunchroom manager falsified attendance records, the OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that the lunchroom manager, on numerous occasions, represented on CPS Daily Record of Employees’ Time forms that she arrived at work at 6:00 a.m. when in fact she did not. The OIG investigation further revealed that the lunchroom manager engaged in secondary employment without notifying the CPS Ethics Officer, and engaged in secondary employment which conflicted with the duties and demands of her position in that she conducted activities on behalf of her secondary employment positions while on duty with CPS, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. The OIG investigation also revealed that the lunchroom manager was inattentive to her duty, in that she left cash collected from the lunchroom on her desk OIG Fiscal Year 2009 chair and failed to reasonably secure it. The lunchroom manager was terminated from

CPS employment and designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6663)

The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school engineer which revealed that:

o The engineer resided in Dixmoor, Illinois, in violation of the CPS Residency Policy.

o The engineer falsified his attendance records in that he represented that he was working when in fact he was not at his school, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.

o The engineer engaged in activities at a car wash that he owned which conflicted with his CPS duties, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education.

o The school business manager assigned to the same school as the engineer, swiped-in the engineer as working when in fact he was not at the school, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.

o The elementary school principal allowed employees to store their CPS employee identification cards near the school’s Kronos machine which allowed employees to easily swipe-in for a co-worker when in fact the co-worker is not present for work.

Following the OIG investigation, the engineer was terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6787)

An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school teacher utilized sick leave in an unauthorized manner in that he utilized sick time when in fact he was not sick but on a personal trip to Florida, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The OIG investigation further revealed that the school’s principal approved the use of sick time in an unauthorized manner, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The principal subsequently retired and the teacher received school based discipline. (6597)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that two elementary school custodians and a contract custodian falsified their attendance records in that they represented that they were working when in fact they left school property for more than two hours beyond their lunch and break periods. The CPS custodians were issued a five day suspension. (7269)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school custodial worker and two privatized custodial workers assigned to the same high school falsified their attendance records in that each was represented as working when in fact he was not at the school. The OIG investigation further revealed that the three men falsified attendance records in that each swiped-out another. In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that one of the privatized custodial workers drank and possessed alcoholic beverages while at work. The CPS custodial worker was terminated from CPS employment and designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7175)

An OIG investigation revealed that an engineer assigned to an elementary school falsified his attendance records, in that on at least ninety-six occasions, during a thirteen month period, he fraudulently misrepresented that he was on duty at the school when in fact he was at a fitness facility. In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that on at least ten occasions in less than a one month period, he represented that he was on duty at the school when he was also recorded as working at a non-CPS facility. The engineer resigned from CPS employment and was designated ineligible to be rehired. (6320)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school teacher falsified his attendance records in that on numerous occasions he had a co-worker, another high school teacher, swipe him out when in fact he had already left the school a school period earlier. One of the teachers involved in the scheme to falsify attendance records was terminated, the other faces pending disciplinary action. (7625)

The OIG conducted an investigation of an engineer assigned to an elementary school and a custodial worker employed by a CPS vendor which revealed that the engineer falsified her attendance records in that on numerous occasions she had the contract custodial worker swipe her in the morning when in fact she was not yet at school, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. Additionally, the engineer made at least two false statements during an interview with the OIG, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The engineer was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated ineligible to be rehired. (7298)

Falsification of School Records. The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school teacher, who was also the school’s dean of attendance, failed to ensure that the attendance of students was accurately recorded. The investigation revealed that the teacher instructed the school’s attendance office staff to submit default attendance in IMPACT, the CPS student record and attendance keeping application, when a teacher failed to submit attendance in a timely fashion and made little effort to ensure that the teacher’s actual documented class attendance was subsequently obtained and accurately recorded in IMPACT. The OIG investigation also revealed that the teacher failed to ensure that the attendance of students was accurately recorded in that on various occasions the actual student attendance submitted by substitute teachers was ignored and default attendance was recorded in IMPACT reflecting students as present when in fact they were not present. (6684)

Misuse of the Internet, An OIG investigation revealed that a central office employee posted sexually explicit personal ads online and accessed pornographic photographs sent in response to the postings via the CPS network while at work, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. The employee was laid off and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7065)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a central office employee, during more than a three month period, received and sent several e-mails containing pornographic images via the CPS network and/or the employee’s CPS e-mail account, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. (7325)

An investigation of a CPS professional revealed that during a one-month period the professional sent and received e-mails containing pornographic images via the professional’s CPS e-mail account, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. (7330)

An employee of a vendor was investigated for misuse of the CPS network and the investigation revealed that the vendor’s employee sent an e-mail containing a pornographic image via the employee’s CPS e-mail account, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. (7337)

An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school principal received and sent an e-mail containing a pornographic image via the principal’s CPS e-mail account, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. (7343)

An OIG investigation of an assistant principal revealed that the assistant principal sent an e-mail containing a pornographic image via the assistant principal’s CPS e-mail account, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. (7347)

An OIG investigation revealed that a central office employee sent an e-mail containing pornographic images via the CPS network to a co-worker’s CPS e-mail account, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. (7383)

A substitute teacher was investigated for misuse of the CPS network and the investigation revealed that the substitute teacher, while assigned to an elementary school, utilized a classroom computer and the CPS network to access a website containing sexually explicit images, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. The substitute teacher was terminated and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7441)

Vendor Misconduct. The OIG conducted an investigation of a vendor providing services to a central office department. The OIG investigation revealed the following:

o The vendor had previously resigned from her position with CPS in the central office department and a do not hire was placed on her employment record following an investigation by the OIG which revealed that, when an employee, the vendor resided outside the City of Chicago. Shortly thereafter, the vendor obtained a CPS vendor number and began performing services for the central office department where she had worked.

o The vendor was paid in excess of $25,000, through various budget units of the central office department for services provided to the department during fiscal years 2007, 2008 and 2009 without obtaining the required approval of the Chief Purchasing Officer, in violation of Board Rule 5-4.1.

o The payments made to the vendor were divided or strung among various purchase orders payable through various budget units within the central office, despite the fact that the vendor provided services only to the one central office department, in order to avoid the Board Rule requirement that the Chief Purchasing Officer approve agreements for non-biddable items in excess of $25,000.00, in violation of Board Rule 5-30 and the Illinois Criminal Code, 720 ILCS 33E-18.

o The vendor provided services to the central office department in excess of $25,000.00 without the agreement being evidenced by a written contract, in violation of Board Rule 2-5.1.

Based on the investigation, the OIG recommended the following:

o CPS immediately cease doing business with the vendor and debar the vendor from doing business with CPS in the future.

o CPS take appropriate disciplinary action against several CPS employees – a director, a senior manager, a chief officer, and a business manager assigned to the central office department who was the husband of the vendor — for their roles in approving purchase orders payable to the vendor in violation of Board Rules and the Illinois Criminal Code.

o CPS initiate a policy requiring the Department of Procurement and Contracts, prior to granting a vendor number to a prospective vendor, to determine whether the vendor has been a CPS employee in the past, and if so, whether a do not hire or “DNH” was placed on the former employee’s file. If the Department of Procurement and Contracts determines that a do not hire was placed on the CPS file of the prospective vendor when the prospective vendor left CPS employment, the policy should further require the Department of Procurement and Contracts to obtain the approval of the Law Department prior to issuing the prospective vendor a CPS vendor number.

Debarment proceedings against the vendor are pending. (7093)

The OIG conducted an investigation of a vendor after receiving an allegation that the vendor was not an authorized reseller of a product it was offering to sell CPS pursuant to a competitive bid the vendor had submitted. The OIG investigation confirmed the allegation and in addition found that the vendor misrepresented, in its response to the CPS solicitation, that it maintained an inventory of the product in question, when in fact it admittedly did not have any of the items in its inventory. Based on the investigation, the OIG recommended that CPS determine whether the vendor’s misrepresentations were material to its solicitation response. If CPS determined that the vendor’s misrepresentations were material to the solicitation response, such finding should serve as grounds to deem the vendor not responsive. Likewise, if CPS determined that the misrepresentations by the vendor were material, CPS should institute debarment proceedings against the vendor in that material misrepresentations reflect a lack of business integrity. As a result of the OIG investigation, CPS issued another solicitation for the products contained in the original solicitation. (7133)

Misuse of CPS Services. An OIG investigation revealed that a high school a teacher utilized the CPS e-mail system to transmit e-mails to numerous CPS employees regarding non-CPS related

business, in violation of the CPS Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. (6934)

A similar OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school teacher utilized Board services without authorization, in that he utilized the CPS mail run system to distribute envelopes for non-CPS related business, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. (7359)

Mistreatment of CPS students. The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school teacher following an allegation that he physically abused a fourth grade student. The OIG investigation revealed that the evidence obtained by the OIG supported the findings of a previous

investigation conducted by another CPS department, specifically that credible evidence did not exist to support the allegation that the teacher slammed the student into a desk, and that credible evidence did exist to support the finding that the teacher restrained the student in an effort to keep him from causing bodily harm to himself and other students. However, during the course of the OIG investigation, several students stated to the OIG that the teacher used a belt to strike various students.

The OIG investigation of this allegation revealed that the teacher used corporal punishment that resulted in the deliberate use of physical force with a student, in that the teacher struck two elementary school students with a belt, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The teacher was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated ineligible to be rehired. (7614)

The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school kindergarten teacher following an allegation that the teacher physically abused students. The OIG investigation revealed that the teacher used corporal punishment that resulted in the deliberate use of physical force with students, in that she struck two kindergarten students on the buttocks with a belt; she struck another student with a belt; she struck two students on the buttocks with her hand; and, struck another student approximately twenty times with a belt on his legs as “birthday licks”, in a manner that was “definitely harder than a tap causing a slight sting.” All of these acts were in violation of the Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy and contrary to the CPS Student Social and Emotional Health Policy. Disciplinary action against the teacher is pending. (7620)

Following an allegation that a high school student was strip-searched, and an investigation of the incident by another CPS department, the OIG conducted an investigation of a high school teacher and a school security officer. Based on the fact that an attorney for the student allegedly strip-searched would not allow his client to be interviewed by the OIG, the OIG could not make any findings concerning the alleged strip search of the student. However, the OIG investigation revealed that the teacher made false, inaccurate, or deliberately incomplete statements during an official investigation, in that he made directly conflicting statements during interviews by two other CPS departments and the OIG. The OIG investigation further revealed that the school security officer also made false, inaccurate, or deliberately incomplete statements during an official inquiry, investigation, or other official proceeding, in that he made directly conflicting statements during interviews by two other CPS departments and the OIG. The security officer was subsequently laid off from CPS employment. (7651)

Miscellaneous Investigations. The OIG completed three investigations of a school clerk assistant assigned to a high school. During the course of the OIG investigations, the school clerk assistant

resigned from CPS employment and was designated ineligible to be rehired. The investigations revealed that the school clerk assistant had engaged in various activities which violated Board rules and policies, including the following:

o The school clerk assistant, while a CPS employee and contemporaneously the director of operations for a not-for-profit organization, signed contracts between CPS and the not-for-profit entity, on behalf of the not-for-profit entity for the installation and use of sports fields on a high school campus. As such, the school clerk assistant had a direct economic interest in a contract of the Board, where the expense, price or consideration of the contract was authorized by action of the Board, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education and the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.

o The school clerk assistant, on several occasions, failed to return to work on time after lunch, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The school clerk assistant spent significant time daily working on the sports fields on the high school campus while on CPS time, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy and contrary to the written agreement between CPS and the not-for-profit entity which called for the not-for-profit entity to provide field maintenance.

o The school clerk assistant falsified his attendance records, in that he represented that he was working when in fact he was not performing CPS related activities, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.

o The school clerk assistant allowed an expelled CPS student, who never attended the high school and was not attending a CPS school, to play in a baseball game for the high school, despite the school clerk assistant receiving a written warning in 2001 for allowing athletically ineligible students to compete in interscholastic sports.

o The school clerk assistant was insubordinate, in that on numerous occasions he failed to carry out his principal’s directive to not bring the expelled CPS student onto the high school campus, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.

The OIG also pointed out in its report to CPS administration that on four previous occasions, the school clerk assistant was disciplined by CPS or resigned prior to disciplinary action. On the occasion where the school clerk resigned prior to being disciplined by CPS, a do not hire was placed on his file, but nevertheless the school clerk assistant was subsequently re-hired by CPS. (6371, 6528, 7112)

Later in the year, following the release of the OIG reports regarding the school clerk assistant mentioned above, the OIG learned that the former school clerk assistant had returned to the high school as a volunteer assistant boy’s baseball coach despite having a “do not hire” on his personnel records. As a result of this new revelation, the investigations mentioned above and an extensive disciplinary history, the OIG informed CPS administration that continuing to allow the coach to be affiliated with CPS presented a serious risk to CPS that the coach would engage in future misconduct if he is allowed to be involved in any CPS activities, even as a volunteer assistant baseball coach. The OIG recommended that the coach not be allowed to serve as a volunteer assistant boy’s baseball coach at the high school or to be involved in any other way with a CPS activity. (7514)

The OIG conducted an investigation that revealed that a health service nurse violated a Loaned Equipment Agreement that she signed to obtain a CPS issued laptop computer by failing to safeguard the laptop since it was stolen at an airport in Mexico and by failing to report the loss of the computer to her supervisor within twenty-four hours. The OIG investigation also revealed that the nurse used a total of four sick days in an unauthorized manner in that she utilized sick days when in fact she was not sick but utilized the sick days for personal travel, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The nurse was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be hired. (6751)

The OIG conducted four investigations which revealed that CPS employees cashed their original paychecks after claiming that they did not receive the original paycheck and after being issued and cashing a replacement check.

o A cook assigned to an elementary school cashed a CPS payroll check for $711.78 after claiming that she did not receive the check and after receiving and cashing a CPS replacement check. (6922)

o An employee on a miscellaneous payroll assigned to a central office department cashed a CPS payroll check in the amount of $281.45 after claiming that she did not receive the check and after receiving a replacement check which she subsequently also cashed. The employee was terminated from CPS employment. (7428)

o Another employee on a miscellaneous payroll assigned to an elementary school cashed a CPS payroll check in the amount of $679.16 after representing that she did not receive the check and after receiving and cashing a CPS replacement check in the amount of $679.16. The employee was terminated and designated ineligible to be rehired. (7569)

o An employee on a miscellaneous payroll assigned to a central office department cashed two CPS payroll checks totaling $801.46 after claiming that he did not receive the checks and after receiving and cashing CPS replacement checks for those two checks. The employee was terminated from CPS employment. (7018)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school teacher made false certifications on applications to the Chicago Housing Choice Voucher Program, in that he failed to include his income from CPS employment, causing the Chicago Housing Authority to provide rent subsidies totaling $49,337.00 during a five to six year period on his behalf to which he was not entitled. The teacher was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated ineligible to be rehired. (6407)

An OIG investigation revealed that a high school special education classroom assistant, who was also a girl’s basketball coach, placed an order for sports equipment without the pre-approval of the principal, contrary to the CPS Internal Accounts Manual. The special education classroom assistant resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6701)

An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school teacher failed to notify the CPS Ethics Officer that she engaged in secondary employment with the Chicago Transit Authority, in violation of the Code of Ethics of the Board of Education and the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The OIG investigation revealed that the teacher also utilized sick time with CPS when in fact she was not sick, in that on thirteen occasions she worked at her job with the Chicago Transit Authority on the same days that she represented to CPS that she was sick, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. This employee also resided in Glenwood, Illinois, in violation of the CPS Residency Policy. This investigation is also mentioned in the Residency section of this report. During the course of the OIG investigation, the teacher resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6021)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an elementary school teacher improperly used a CPS tax-exempt letter when she purchased a $1.00 bottle of lemonade at a local dollar store. The investigation also revealed that the teacher not only used the CPS tax-exempt letter to save seven cents at the dollar store, but also had used the CPS tax-exempt letter to make personal purchases, including purchases of shoes, clothes, groceries, perfume and many other items from retail stores like Walgreen’s, Dominick’s, Marshall Fields, Whole Foods and Water Tower stores. The teacher admitted to the OIG that she had been using the CPS tax-exempt letter to avoid paying tax on personal purchases for 5 years. The OIG investigation revealed that the teacher thought that using the CPS tax-exempt letter to avoid paying taxes on personal purchases was appropriate since, when she obtained her new CPS ID Plus Card in 2003, the card was advertised as providing “special offers” to CPS teachers, including tax-exempt purchases at various retailers. The OIG also learned during the course of its investigation, that the CPS website contained a page listing the functions and benefits of the CPS ID Plus Card, which included a bullet point under a section entitled “…Special Offers for Teachers” indicating that the ID card could be used for tax-exempt purchases at various retailers. The OIG subsequently learned that

utilization of the ID Plus Card for tax-exempt purchases at various retailers was a concept that was never implemented. Based on the investigation, the OIG recommended that CPS, in addition to taking disciplinary action against the teacher, should revise its website reference to the ID Plus Card being used to make taxexempt purchases at various retailers since that is apparently not a current function of the CPS ID card and may confuse CPS employees. Following the OIG investigation and recommendations, the teacher was issued a warning resolution and CPS removed reference to tax-exempt purchases using the ID Plus Card from its website. (6753)

An OIG investigation revealed that a high school military instructor falsified employment records by representing that he had earned a master’s degree from two universities when in fact those entities were not legitimate educational institutions but “diploma mills”, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The OIG investigation also revealed that the instructor misappropriated more than $13,000.00 of CPS funds when he requested and received a higher rate of pay as a military instructor who had a master’s degree, when in fact his master’s degree was not legitimately earned, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. In addition to taking the appropriate disciplinary action against the instructor, the OIG also recommended that CPS utilize all legal remedies to recoup more than $13,000.00 from the instructor in salary and pension benefits that were paid to him based on his representation that he had a legitimate master’s degree when in fact he did not. In addition, the OIG recommended that CPS review its procedures regarding the processing of lane adjustments since despite the fact that the instructor’s request for a lane advancement was rejected by CPS Salary Administration, Staffing & Enrollment because his master’s degree was from a diploma mill, he still received the higher rate of pay as military instructor who has a master’s degree. Following the OIG investigation, the instructor was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7118)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an elementary school assistant principal failed to show-up to perform her duties at the elementary school to which she was assigned but swiped-in and out at a high school despite not being assigned a position at the high school. The investigation also revealed that the high school principal allowed the assistant principal to perform services at the high school and accepted “volunteer” services from the assistant principal despite the fact that the assistant was still assigned to the elementary school. Following the OIG investigation, the principal was issued a 10-day suspension. (7198)

The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school special education

teacher which revealed that:

o The teacher engaged in secondary employment at a camp in Colorado which conflicted with her CPS duties and obtained, accepted and engaged in that secondary employment without first notifying the CPS ethics officer, in violation of the Code of Ethics of the Chicago Board of Education.

o The teacher committed the criminal offense of forgery in that she made and delivered a document capable of defrauding another in such a manner that it purports to have been made by another, when she forged a letter purportedly from her father’s doctor in order to provide justification for sick days when in fact she was engaging in secondary employment in Colorado, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.

o The teacher falsified employment records when she forged a letter purportedly from her father’s doctor in order to provide justification for sick days when in fact she was engaging in secondary employment in Colorado, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.

o The teacher utilized sick days in an unauthorized manner in that she utilized sick days when neither she nor a family member was sick but in fact she was engaging in secondary employment at a camp in Colorado, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.

o The teacher made numerous false statements during an interview as part of an official investigation by the OIG, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.

The teacher subsequently resigned from CPS employment. (7201)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an elementary school teacher, during a nine year period, understated and misrepresented her income on applications for free and reduced-price meals submitted on behalf of two of her children, enabling them to receive free meal benefits to which they were not entitled. The fraudulent representations by the teacher potentially resulted in more than $8,000.00 in free meal benefits being provided to the teacher’s two children despite the fact that they were ineligible for such benefits. The OIG investigation further revealed that during a five year period, a guidance counselor assistant assigned to the same elementary school, understated and misrepresented her family’s income on applications for free and reduced-price meals submitted on behalf of two of her children, enabling them to receive free meal benefits to which they were not entitled. The fraudulent representations by the guidance counselor assistant potentially resulted in more than $4,300.00 in free meal benefits being provided to the guidance counselor assistant’s two children despite the fact that they were ineligible for such benefits. During the course of the investigation, the guidance counselor assistant was laid off from her position. Subsequent to the investigation, the guidance counselor assistant was designated as ineligible to be rehired. Disciplinary action against the teacher is pending. (6853)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a school security officer assigned to an elementary school engaged in secondary employment which conflicted with his CPS employment, in that the security officer engaged in secondary employment while on sick time with CPS; accepted secondary employment without first notifying the CPS ethics officer; utilized sick time in an unauthorized manner in that he utilized sick time when in fact he was not sick but working his second job; took a medical leave of absence on fraudulent grounds, in that he requested and took a medical leave of absence in order to work at his second job; and, was granted a CPS leave of absence for his own personal illness and worked secondary employment during the period of the leave, all in violation of Board rules and policies. During the course of the OIG investigation the security officer resigned from his position with CPS. Following the OIG investigation, the school security officer was designated ineligible to be rehired. (7178)

The OIG conducted an investigation of a high school teacher which revealed the

following:

o The teacher engaged in secondary employment which conflicted with CPS employment, in that she engaged in employment with another school district while on sick time with CPS;

o The teacher obtained and accepted secondary employment with the other school district without first notifying the CPS ethics officer, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education;

o The teacher utilized sick time in an unauthorized manner in that she utilized CPS sick time when she was working at the other school district; and,

o The teacher requested and took a medical leave of absence on fraudulent grounds, in that she requested and took a leave of absence from CPS in order to work at the other school district.

During the course of the investigation, the teacher resigned from employment with CPS. Following the OIG investigation, the teacher was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7205)

An OIG investigation revealed that a senior analyst assigned to a central office department improperly received more than $32,000.00 in salary after she had been laid off from her position with CPS. (7214)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a porter falsified CPS employment records when attempting to secure employment with CPS in that he utilized an invalid social security number on numerous CPS employment documents, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The porter was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6770)

An OIG investigation of a high school administration, including the principal and school business manager, revealed that:

o The principal and business manager failed to obtain Local School Council approval for a School Usage Permit for the use of the school’s auxiliary gym by an entertainment company for a fundraising event, in violation of the CPS Insider’s Guide to School Business and Internal Accounts (“Internal Accounts Manual”).

o The principal and school business manager failed to obtain Local School Council approval for a separate fundraising dance at the school, in violation of the CPS Internal Accounts Manual.

o The entertainment company, which promoted the fundraising dance in the school’s gym, failed to meet the insurance requirements of a School Usage Permit when its insurance broker failed to bind the policy with the insurance provider, in violation of the CPS Internal Accounts Manual. This became problematic when the school suffered almost $10,000.00 in damage as a result of the dance.

o Both the school administration and the entertainment company failed to pay City of Chicago and Cook County amusement taxes on potentially $4,000.00 collected during the dance that did not directly benefit the school’s students.

o The principal and school business manager allowed a fundraising dance to be conducted at the school past 10:30 p.m. on a Sunday, in violation of the curfew rules of the Municipal Code of Chicago.

o The principal and school business manager allowed a fundraising dance to be conducted in the school’s auxiliary gym which compromised the safe capacity of the school’s auxiliary gym.

As a result of the OIG investigation, the principal was issued a warning resolution and a 20-day suspension. The school business manager was issued a 10-day suspension. (6598)

An OIG investigation revealed that a day-to-day substitute teacher, who had retired from her position as a high school teacher, retaliated against a clerk at the school to which the teacher was assigned because the clerk had filed a complaint with the OIG. Specifically, the teacher made derogatory remarks to the clerk and threw a bag containing a plastic rat on the clerk’s desk, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The substitute teacher was terminated from CPS employment and designated ineligible to be rehired. (7483)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school teacher was arrested for false personation of a public officer, theft of lost or mislaid property, and various traffic offenses. In addition, the teacher falsified his CPS attendance records in that on at least ten occasions the teacher represented that he was working when in fact he was attending court while on CPS time. The teacher also utilized sick leave in an unauthorized manner, in that on at least six occasions the teacher utilized sick time when in fact he was not sick but attending court. The investigation also revealed that the teacher used school property without authorization, in that the teacher stored numerous personal vehicles on school property and utilized tools and parts to repair these vehicles. All of these actions were in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The teacher was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6239)

The OIG conducted an investigation of a high school teacher which revealed that the teacher falsified official school documents in that she understated her income on free and reduced-price meal applications submitted on behalf of her two daughters for two school years which enabled the students to receive free or reduced-price meal benefits to which they were not entitled. The teacher also failed to obtain a School Usage Permit and requisite insurance to utilize the high school gymnasium for practices for her club sports team, in violation of the CPS Insider’s Guide to School Business and Internal Accounts. Disciplinary action against the teacher is pending.

(6707)

An OIG investigation revealed that a high school engineer forged the name of another engineer on numerous invoices regarding personal purchases that the offending engineer made on the school account at a local hardware store. During the course of the investigation, the offending engineer resigned from his position with CPS and was subsequently designated ineligible to be rehired. (7480)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school security officer leased the high school facility on numerous weekends without depositing the funds received from the leasing of the facility with the school treasurer and without following various requirements regarding the leasing of school property contained in the CPS Internal Accounts Manual. The OIG investigation further revealed that the school’s principal participated in or acquiesced in the scheme with the security officer to lease the high school facility on numerous weekends without depositing the funds received from the leasing of the facility with the school treasurer and without following various requirements regarding the leasing of school property. The school security officer was laid off from CPS during the course of the investigation and the principal was terminated from CPS employment and designated ineligible to be rehired. (7223)

The OIG conducted an investigation of two employees of a privatized custodial vendor which revealed that one of the custodians provided a social security number which was assigned to another individual when submitting to fingerprinting by CPS and the other custodian provided an invalid social security number when submitting to fingerprinting by CPS. Also, during the course of this investigation, the OIG met with representatives of the CPS Law, Purchasing and Human Resources Departments. Based on this meeting, it was determined that CPS will initiate a procedure regarding notifying vendors when CPS discovers that documentation regarding an employee of the vendor is suspected to be fraudulent at the time of fingerprinting. This procedure will apply to other vendors as well. (7251)

After receiving an allegation concerning the background of a miscellaneous employee performing security services at an elementary school, an OIG investigation revealed that, four years ago, the employee was indicted by a Cook County grand jury on twenty-six counts of official misconduct, two counts of battery, and four counts of attempt to obstruct justice based on an incident while he was employed by a previous employer. In addition, the employee plead guilty to one count of misdemeanor battery and was sentenced to serve an eighteen month term of probation and was discharged from his position with the previous employer. The OIG recommended that CPS take appropriate disciplinary action against the employee. (7568)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school teacher fraudulently misrepresented that he was going to reside in a home he was purchasing to meet an eligibility requirement for obtaining financial assistance from the CPS funded Employer Assisted Housing Program. The OIG investigation revealed that the teacher never resided at the house but nevertheless received the $3,000 in financial assistance. (7235)

An OIG investigation revealed that a high school teacher fraudulently misrepresented on an Illinois State Board of Education Application for Provisional Vocational Certificate that he had a pharmacist license when in fact that license had been revoked almost one year earlier, in violation of the School Code of Illinois and the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The teacher retired pending disciplinary action and has been designated ineligible to be rehired. (6896)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a special education classroom assistant assigned to a high school failed to properly dispose of Special Education Student Folders, by dumping ten boxes containing the student records in recycling carts in various public alleys, in violation of the CPS Maintenance and Retention of School Student Records policy and the CPS Discipline and Due Process Policy. Additionally, the classroom assistant made false, inaccurate, or deliberately incomplete statements during an official investigation, in that he made at least three statements to the OIG that were later directly contradicted, in violation of the CPS Discipline and Due Process Policy. Disciplinary action against the classroom assistant is pending. (8038)

The OIG conducted an investigation of a high school principal and a provisionally certificated substitute teacher who was also the varsity football coach at the high school. The OIG investigation revealed that the principal engaged in an act prohibited by federal statutes, in that he committed the offense of false declarations before a grand jury or court by making a false affirmation under penalty of perjury in a declaration submitted as part of a lawsuit. The OIG investigation also revealed that the substitute teacher made a false statement in an official investigation, in that during an interview with the OIG, the substitute teacher made a false statement concerning the date on which he typed a letter to the principal. Both the principal and substitute teacher were terminated from CPS employment and have been designated ineligible to be rehired. (7440)

Residency. To comply with the CPS Residency Policy, employees hired after November 20, 1996 must reside within the City of Chicago. The CPS Residency Policy mandates that employees, unless granted a waiver because they teach in an identified “special needs” area, must maintain a City of Chicago domicile defined as the one true, permanent home to which whenever they are absent they have an intention of returning. The OIG has been delegated the responsibility of investigating allegations of non-residency and in fact, the OIG receives more complaints of employees violating the Residency Policy than any other rule violation.

In FY 09, the 202 complaints of alleged residency violations received by the OIG totaled more than 16% of all the complaints received by the OIG. To help ensure that all employees are treated fairly, consistently and equitably; to reduce animosity between those employees who abide by the residency requirement and those who do not, thereby enhancing employee production; and, to set the tone that CPS rules and policies must be adhered to, the OIG delegates resources to investigate alleged violations of the Residency Policy.

The Residency Policy reflects that employees who intentionally submit a false residential address to avoid the requirements of the policy have engaged in irremediable conduct punishable by discharge. In FY 09, the OIG issued the following reports on employees who intentionally submitted false residential addresses reflecting that they lived in the City of Chicago when in fact they did not. Based on an OIG recommendation, in each case the employees resigned from CPS employment, were terminated or were suspended without pay pending a hearing and most were designated as ineligible to be rehired.

A school operations manager was found to be residing in Flossmoor, IL. This employee was also involved in falsifying attendance records and that facet of the investigation is reported in the appropriate section of this report. The school operations manager was terminated from CPS employment and designated ineligible to be rehired. (4016)

An investigation revealed that a teacher resided in Glenwood, IL. This teacher was also investigated for ethics violations for failure to report secondary employment and that facet of the investigation is reported in the appropriate section of this report. The teacher resigned and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6627)

A school clerk assistant lived in Lincolnwood, IL., in violation of the Residency Policy. Discipline against the school clerk assistant is pending. (6218)

An elementary school teacher was found to be residing in Deerfield, IL. The teacher resigned and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6219)

An elementary school teacher was found to be residing in Evanston, IL. A co-worker was also involved in the residency scheme, having allowed the teacher to use her city address. The co-schemer also made false statements to the OIG during its investigation. The teacher was terminated and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. The co-schemer received a 16 day suspension. (6221)

An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school teacher assistant resided in Lincolnwood, IL. The teacher assistant resigned from CPS employment and has been designated ineligible to be rehired. (6590)

A high school teacher was found to be residing in Country Club Hills, IL. The teacher resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6674)

A high school principal was found to be residing in Oak Park, IL. The principal subsequently resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6745)

A school engineer resided in Westchester, IL., in violation of the Residency Policy. Disciplinary action against the engineer is pending. (6760)

An elementary school principal was found to be residing in Romeoville, IL. The principal subsequently resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6798)

An elementary school teacher resided in Oak Lawn, IL. The teacher was terminated from CPS employment and designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6914)

An investigation revealed that a high school teacher resided in Oak Lawn, IL. The investigation also revealed that the teacher assisted a co-worker in falsifying the coworker’s attendance records, as reported above. Disciplinary action against the teacher is pending. (7637)

Employees who do not intentionally provide a false residential address to avoid the residency requirement are allowed to remediate their misconduct by coming into compliance with the residency requirement. The following OIG investigations dealt with employees who did not provide a false residential address.

An elementary school principal was found to be residing in Crete, IL. This principal, as reported above, was also involved in making unnecessary purchases of equipment for the school. The principal left CPS employment before the completion of the OIG investigation and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7095)

An elementary school assistant principal resided in Maywood, IL. The assistant principal subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6962)

An elementary school assistant principal resided in Phoenix, IL. Following the OIG investigation, the assistant principal came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6964)

A high school assistant principal resided in Park Ridge, IL. The assistant principal came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6966)

A high school principal resided in Oak Park, IL. The principal came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6969)

An elementary school assistant principal resided in South Holland, IL. The assistant principal came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6970)

A high school assistant principal resided in Evanston, IL. The assistant principal was issued a written reprimand and came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6972)

An elementary school teacher resided in Park Forest, IL. The teacher was issued a warning resolution and came into compliance with the residency requirement. (7092)

A database analyst resided in Crete, IL. The database analyst came into compliance with the residency requirement. (7101)

An engineer resided in Calumet City, IL. The engineer was issued a written reprimand and was suspended. (7102)

A central office employee resided in Glenwood, IL. The employee subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (7103)

A high school student advocate resided in Maywood, IL. The student advocate was subsequently laid off from CPS employment. (7364)

A high school teacher resided in Orland Park, IL. The teacher was subsequently issued a waiver from the residency requirement. (6941)

Residency / Tuition Fraud. The Office of the Inspector General has been delegated the responsibility of conducting investigations into allegations that various Chicago Public School students reside outside the City of Chicago, a violation of the Illinois School Code. In FY 09, five of these investigations conducted by the OIG found that CPS employees falsified their children’s residential address, as well as their own residential address on employment records with CPS, and enrolled their children in CPS despite residing in the suburbs. In addition to being subject to discipline for residing in the suburbs, the employees are also liable for the payment of non-resident tuition for enrolling their children in CPS while residing in the suburbs. These investigations are detailed below.

An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school clerk resided in Alsip, IL. The investigation revealed that three of the school clerk’s children attended CPS while residing in Alsip, thereby causing the school clerk to be liable for the payment of nonresident

tuition in the amount of $61,173.17. The school clerk was terminated from CPS employment and designated ineligible to be rehired and an action to recover the non-resident tuition is pending. (4543)

An elementary school cook resided in Evergreen Park, IL. and sent her granddaughter, for whom she was the guardian, to a CPS elementary school for a number of years. The cook is responsible for the payment of non-resident tuition in the amount of $56,345.07. The cook was terminated and designated as ineligible to be rehired. CPS is attempting to recover the non-resident tuition owed. (5757)

An elementary school clerk resided in Oak Forest, while her daughter attended a CPS high school. The school clerk is responsible for the payment of non-resident tuition in the amount of $17,619.38. The school clerk resigned and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. CPS is attempting to recover the non-resident tuition owed. (5963)

An elementary school teacher resided in Franklin Park, IL while enrolling three of her children in various CPS schools, including the school where she worked. The teacher is responsible for the payment of non-resident tuition in the amount of $100,237.38. The teacher resigned from CPS employment. CPS is attempting to recover the nonresident tuition owed. (6220)

An elementary school teacher resided in Lincolnwood, IL. and sent her three children to CPS schools, including the school where she worked. The teacher is responsible for the payment of non-resident tuition in the amount of $88,687.59. The teacher resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. CPS is attempting to recover the non-resident tuition owed. (6589)

Two children of a CPS employee attended a CPS elementary school despite residing in South Holland, IL, and their mother, a high school teacher, is liable for non-resident tuition in the amount of $35,238.76. CPS is attempting to recover the non-resident tuition owed. (6709)

Criminal Conduct. An elementary school teacher was arrested and charged with the offense of

aggravated battery to a police officer after spitting in the face of a police officer. The teacher plead guilty to a charge of misdemeanor battery and was sentenced to three years of probation. The teacher’s principal was notified of the incident and no discipline was imposed. (6493)

The OIG received notification that a high school lunchroom employee was arrested and charged with the offenses of attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery after stabbing a woman in the chest. The employee plead guilty to the charge of aggravated battery and was sentenced to serve a term of four years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The employee was terminated from CPS employment and designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6301)

An elementary school custodial worker was arrested and charged with the felony offense of aggravated driving under the influence after police observed him driving drunk with children in his vehicle. The custodial worker plead guilty to the charge of aggravated driving under the influence and was sentenced to 18 months of probation. The custodial worker subsequently retired from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6902)

An OIG investigation revealed that a substitute teacher was arrested and charged with the offense of aggravated assault to a police officer. The substitute teacher plead guilty to a charge of aggravated assault and was sentenced to 16 days in the Cook County Department of Corrections. The substitute teacher was terminated from CPS employment. (7492)

An elementary school teacher was arrested and charged with the felony offense of theft after fraudulently obtaining $2000 after using another person’s debit card. The teacher plead guilty and was sentenced to 13 months of court supervision. The OIG investigation also revealed that the teacher utilized sick time to attend court on two separate days, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. Disciplinary action against the teacher is pending. (7273)

An elementary school guidance counselor assistant was arrested and charged with the offense of possession of a controlled substance. The charges were subsequently dismissed, however, during an interview with the OIG, the guidance counselor assistant admitted to possessing PCP when she was arrested. In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that the guidance counselor assistant utilized sick time for two days that she was actually in custody and on one day that she attended court, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The guidance

counselor was terminated from CPS employment and designated ineligible to be rehired. (7312)

Two elementary school teachers were each issued citations for possession of marijuana on state land in Wisconsin. One of the teachers was also issued a citation for possession of drug paraphernalia. One teacher paid a $249.00 fine after being issued the citation for possessing 5.66 grams of marijuana. The other teacher paid fines of $249.00 and $300.00 after being issued citations for possessing 8.5 grams of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Disciplinary action against the teachers is pending. (7711)

A high school teacher was arrested and charged with the offenses of possession of cannabis and domestic battery. The teacher plead guilty to the domestic battery charge and was sentenced to 18 months of court supervision. The possession of marijuana charge was dismissed. The OIG investigation further revealed that the teacher utilized sick time for twelve days that he was actually in custody in Cook County jail, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The teacher was terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7586)

A substitute teacher was arrested and charged with the offense of possession of cannabis. The charges against the substitute teacher were dismissed. However, the OIG investigation revealed that the substitute teacher was arrested on three previous occasions and charged with possession of cannabis following each arrest. Following each arrest, the charges against the substitute teacher were dismissed. The substitute teacher was terminated from CPS employment. (7618)

An elementary school custodial worker was arrested for the offense of possession of cannabis. The criminal charges were dismissed, however, during an interview with the OIG, the custodial worker admitted that on the day he was arrested, he purchased cannabis from his granddaughter, smoked cannabis while at his granddaughter’s house, and possessed cannabis in his vehicle at the time he was arrested by the Chicago Police Department. The custodial worker was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7127)

The OIG conducted an investigation of a school security aide assigned to a high school. The OIG investigation revealed that the security aide was convicted of the felony offense of delivery of a controlled substance, which, under the School Code of Illinois, precludes his employment with CPS. The OIG investigation also revealed that the security aide failed to notify CPS of his felony conviction for delivery of a controlled substance within ten days of the conviction, in violation of Board Rule 4-4c. The security aide resigned from CPS employment and was designated ineligible to be rehired. (7153)

An OIG investigation revealed that a school security officer was arrested and charged with the felony offense of criminal sexual assault of a fifteen year old male. The school security officer was terminated from CPS employment and designated as ineligible to be rehired. The school security officer subsequently plead guilty to criminal charges and was sentenced to six months in jail and two years of probation. (6893)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school porter was convicted of the felony offense of delivery of a controlled substance, which, under the School Code of Illinois, precludes her employment with CPS and is in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The OIG investigation also revealed that the porter failed to notify CPS of her felony conviction of delivery of a controlled substance within ten days of the conviction, in violation of Board Rules. The OIG investigation further revealed that the porter used sick leave in an unauthorized manner in that she used sick days on seven occasions when she was attending court regarding her arrest for the offense of delivery of a controlled substance, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The porter was terminated from CPS employment and designated ineligible to be rehired. (7131)

An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school security aide plead guilty to the criminal offense of stealing funds of the United States Postal Service, in violation of 18 United States Code 641. The school security aide was sentenced to three years of probation, four months of home confinement and ordered to pay nearly $14,000 in restitution. In addition, during an interview with the OIG, the security aide admitted that he utilized two United States Postal Service issued gasoline credit cards, which he obtained from his mother who was a United States Postal Service employee, to purchase gas for his personal vehicles and to allow others to purchase gas for their personal vehicles in exchange for cash payments to him, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The OIG investigation further revealed that the security aide, on at least two occasions, utilized sick time when in fact he was not sick, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The security aide was terminated from CPS employment and designated ineligible to be rehired. (7271)

The OIG learned that an elementary school engineer was arrested after he was identified by two former co-workers as the individual who left a voice mail message at an elementary school stating that he was going to blow up the school. The criminal charges against the engineer were subsequently dismissed. No disciplinary action was taken against the engineer. (7645)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an hourly employee assigned to a high school, who had previously taught at the high school, was accused of sexually assaulting family members. The OIG also learned that after being accused of assaulting family members, the employee barricaded himself in the garage of his residence and threatened suicide. The employee was subsequently arrested for that offense and charged with reckless conduct. Those criminal charges were dismissed. During the course of the investigation, the employee had stopped working at the high school and following the investigation was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7747)

On-Duty Criminal Conduct.

The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school custodial worker which revealed the following:

o The custodial worker was arrested and charged with the offense of possession of a controlled substance and that charge was dismissed.

o During an interview with the OIG, the custodial worker stated that he sometimes smokes marijuana for recreational purposes, that he used heroin the day before he was arrested, and that he uses heroin three or four times a week.

o On the day he was arrested, the custodial worker left his duty assignment without permission, while on duty, and was subsequently arrested.

o The next day he utilized a sick day when in fact he was not sick but was in custody regarding his arrest.

Following the OIG investigation, the custodial worker was terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7377)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an elementary school lunchroom attendant was arrested and subsequently charged with the offenses of identity theft and misuse of a credit card after she, while on duty at the elementary school, stole the debit card of a co-worker and utilized the card at a local store to purchase a pack of cigarettes. The lunchroom assistant plead guilty to the criminal charge and was sentenced to four years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The OIG also learned during the course of the investigation that, in a previous unrelated case, the lunchroom attendant plead guilty to the offense of aggravated

identity theft and was sentenced to serve a four year term of probation. Following that conviction, the lunchroom attendant failed to notify the CPS Chief Executive Officer within five days of her conviction for the felony offense of aggravated identity theft, in violation of Board Rules. The lunchroom attendant was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated ineligible to be rehired. (7731)

An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school porter and a custodial worker removed crates of milk from the lunchroom at the school without the authorization of the lunchroom manager. The porter and custodial worker received school based discipline. (7482)



Comments:

December 22, 2009 at 9:19 AM

By: Retired Principal

OIG

George, very interesting!

December 22, 2009 at 10:10 AM

By: George N. Schmidt

IG details. leaks and corruption

Thanks, RP. One of the things we're going to be doing from Substance over the holidays is write to all principals and assistant principals (who seem to be targeted by the IG) asking them to review the report, as we've reproduced it, and the way in which the IG's staff actually operates.

When I was being "investigated" by the IG over a period of more than two years during the late 1990s, the investigator (Hogue, whom I've mentioned) did an ongoing investigation to prove that my work in suppressing the gang activity at Bowen High School (where, as you might remember, I was "security coordinator" for four years before Vallas went after me following the publication in Substance of his stupid CASE tests) was racist. Hogue even went so far as to go into court at Juvie (Hamilton) and tell a judge that I was "under investigation" for racist stuff, thereby delaying a trial for one kid (who had picked a fight and wound up charged with Ag Battery) who began as a juvenile and then wound up, by the time all of the consolidated charges were adjudicated, an adult. The kid wound up with three to five years on four different charges, only one of which was by me (he was eventually found guilty on me, too, after the IG successfully delayed the case over and over and over).

Now here is the tough part (for the kid):

After he was sentenced at 1100 S. Hamilton, the kid came up to me an "wanted to talk" with the sheriffs and police watching. I had had him arrested when he was 14 years old, and thanks to the IG's cover ups (and attacks on me), the kid was now 17 and heading to Stateville.

I told him he had to stand ten feet away if he wanted to talk.

He did. He said he wanted to thank me for trying to straighten him out before it was too late, and he said if all the other people in his life -- including Hogue -- had done more for him, instead of using him, he wouldn't be heading into the penitentiary.

If that kid (now a man, if he's still alive) had gotten probation under a strict juvenile judge when I first had charges brought against him (my two main witnesses were cops), he might have been straightened out. The probation officers who worked around Bowen at the time were very good at trying to do their job, which was to help straighten out kids who had committed crimes and been found "guilty" (in the terms used in Juvie) for them.

Instead, because the IG was kinky, the kid thought (at age 14) that he had the clout to get away with anything. By the time he was 16, he was facing, in addition to the batter charges from me, unlawful use of a weapon, possession, and possession and sale of a controlled substance. I lost track (although there was one more chapter in that story) of the "kid" but never forgot the incident.

And it's never going to be the right time for someone -- probably a grand jury -- to investigate the investigators who have covered up so much at CPS, while doing much of the dirty work for each of the tinpot dictators we've had to deal with since Mayor Daley appointed those two crooks, Paul Vallas and Gery Chico, to "reform" CPS back in July 1995.

December 22, 2009 at 7:56 PM

By: kugler

ronnie promotes porn

what about when ronnie encouraged cps students to twitter that rap star about his birthday sex song? did not that get investigated? at least three violations of employee discipline code.

'Birthday Sex' singer encourages CPS attendance

August 4, 2009 (CHICAGO) (WLS) -- Chicago Public Schools raised some eyebrows by asking R&B singer Jeremih Felton to use Twitter to encourage students to return to school.

Every year at this time, Chicago public school officials pull out all the stops trying to get kids back in class for the fall term. This year, they put aside any prudish notions and called on the "Birthday Sex" man to get the job done.

Felton, 21, is a Morgan Park High School alumnus. The singer, whose best known for his hit song "Birthday Sex," has 75,000 followers on Twitter.

"He's agreeing to help twitter many of our students back to school," said Ron Huberman, Chicago Public Schools CEO.

http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=6948346

Hmmmmmm

December 23, 2009 at 4:19 AM

By: George N. Schmidt

Huberman and Sullivan's Porn Chasers

The Chicago Board of Education may have had to lay off teachers again in October and November 2009, but the ironically named "Office of Performance Management" continued to expand through unchecked patronage hiring by CEO Ron Huberman. Additionally, the report of the Inspector General released the week before Christmas demonstrates that CPS also has a new job, although it's not officially called what it is: "The Office of Pornography Elimination." How else can anyone explain how the OIG located and collected so many dirty pictures form the Internet activities of the teachers, assistant principals and principals who were disciplined, according to the OIG, for "pornography."

To read the report of the Office of the Inspector General for FY 2009 (July 1, 2008 through June 30, 2009), a casual reader would learn that one of the biggest problems facing Chicago's public schools is that some substitute teachers, teachers, assistant principals, and principals sometimes go to "pornography" when using CPS computers.

During the fiscal year that Ron Huberman began rewriting Board Reports after each Board meeting, stalling the publication of the Board's Agenda of Action until he had scrutinized the wording on every document the Board had supposedly voted on, created the $20 million "Office of Performance Management" without public review or approval, and appointed dozens of individuals to jobs paying upwards of $90,000 per year in the "Office of Performance Management" the Inspector General of CPS found pornography -- not "Performance Management" -- to be a main example of unethical or illegal misconduct in CPS.

Were it not so serious, it would be laughable. But a close reading of the recently released OIC report shows an obsession with "pornography" and a complete lack of interest in the activities of the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, the Chief Education Officer, and a number of other chiefs who have been allocating hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayer money to controversial programs, usually without any public discussion or even presentations to the Chicago Board of Education.

If someone were to trace the cultural roots of CPS's obsession with "pornography" — but not with the wasting of hundreds of millions of dollars on crony contracts and patronage hiring — it would provide interesting reading. More than one PhD in psychology or other subjects would probably result.

No where in the OIG report is "pornography" defined, and it seems, now that CPS is constantly monitoring the on-line behavior of principals and teachers, that the answer from the members of the Chicago Board of Education to the question "What is it" will be the classic from the Victorian era (and all earlier eras when the Catholic Church was chasing it down and archiving it at the Vatican):

"I know it when I see it..."

Just what was it you were seeing when you disciplined those teachers, assistant principals, and principals -- and firing that substitute teacher?

December 23, 2009 at 10:11 AM

By: kugler

real waste - runcie

wasn't there a department of technology or something in cps? why would anyone be able to access pornography through a school network unless there was either a dereliction of duty or cps actually allows it to go on to "catch people" and as with my early post it is clear the ceo promotes it.

December 24, 2009 at 3:59 AM

By: Jim Vail

IG Report

Very interesting report George. Looks like a substitute teacher is at the bottom and can be fired with no need for just cause (the route they'd like to see all teachers go with charter schools and no union protection).

What about the poor chap who was arrested on alleged possession of cannabis a few times, but never convicted. He too was fired. Hey - if someone calls me a thief, and I'm just a sub or something - call Mr. Sullivan and he'll try to make sure I never work again.

You should also add how Mr. Sullivan has continued to protect the incredibly corrupt Aspira charter organization. Whistler blower Meg Sullivan wrote to Sullivan to demand an investigation into their illegal actions such as compromising attendance data, changing grades, gross financial irregularities, etc. The current federal lawsuit for strip searching children at the school is proof in the pudding who these guys are.

But what did Mr. Sullivan tell Meg? He said already an employee was fired (Aspira Haugan Principal Jose Velazquez) so no more needs to be done. What? What about Mr. Rodriguez, the "CEO" of Aspira whose former fling on the Board pushed through a pay package to increase his compensation comparable to Mr. Huberman. And that mope has demanded for years that teachers should be held accountable.

And let's not forget good ole machine hack Gov. Quinn who happily awarded these shysters another cool $12 million of our dwindling tax dollars.

Obviously Sullivan and his "Inspector General" status is purely a ruse used to divide and conquer those unruly teachers. You don't like someone in the office - call Mr. Sullivan and tell them you just noticed an email sent out with a lady and a revealing neckline, located several yards outside city limits.

But make sure it ain't the head of Aspira who George said is known as the "godfather" in inner city circles.

December 24, 2009 at 4:25 AM

By: George N. Schmidt

OIG as Mr. Coverup... Charter schools' corruption

For more than ten years (as I noted in the article), the Inspector General's office has been known as the place not to go with a serious complaint about misconduct or criminal behavior in CPS. All the IG does is inform the official in question that a teacher is questioning something, and then the official (a principal; a higher level administrator; the CEO) can use every method available to silence the whistle blower.

Mr. Inspector General, who should be Mr. Integrity, is really Mr. Coverup, as the Aspira event shows in its full glory.

One of the noteworthy things about the OIG report that was released this week is that the only charter school investigated and reported is one that was put out of business for grandiose (and stupid) corruption ten years ago! And even that one is not named.

The numerous people who have tried to get someone at CPS to stop Aspira's predations includes Meg Sullivan. But as many people know, the complaints about Aspira did not begin or end with that teacher (who was fired by Aspira after Mr. Coverup and the Office of New Schools informed Aspira that she had complained). There were many others.

One of the most breathtaking things about the coverup of charter school misconduct is the huge examples that the Inspector General missed — actually, deliberately ignored — during FY 2009.

The corruption at Perspectives Calumet that led to the firing of one teacher was more than just a horny teacher preying on students sexually. It was a coverup of the behavior. Nothing about that in the OIG report for FT 2009, so we have to guess it didn't happen.

The corruption at North Lawndale College Prep Charter School that led to the death of three students in the Fox River was at the least an "ethical problem". Nothing about that in the OIG report for FT 2009, so we have to guess it didn't happen.

And of course the other corruptions at Aspira (not only Aspira Haugan) charter schools — from grade changing to the bookkeeping went far beyond the strip search of those children.

The Inspector General's office should have its own Great Seal. It would be the three monkeys: See No Evil; Hear No Evil; Speak No Evil...

About anyone with clout from City Hall or privatization.

December 24, 2009 at 2:12 PM

By: kugler

Death Investigation Cover Up

what ever happened with the investigation of the death of three students from North Lawndale College Prep?

Never heard anything as far as i know. three students died during a school event.

just think of how clownish and stupid Mr. Sullivan looks investigating bottles of water instead of the death of students.

Mr. Sullivan should be removed from his office and if he has a law license disbarred for endangering students by not removing criminals that cause direct harm to students.

3 students died during a school related event and did the principal get fired and charged with negligence?

John Kugler

kuglerjohn@comcast.net

December 28, 2009 at 11:56 PM

By: Jim Vail

Drowning Incident

Do you guys remember the CPS kid who drowned on a field trip? Very tragic. Several years ago. What ever happened with that?

December 29, 2009 at 5:38 AM

By: George N. Schmidt

Drowning lawsuit settlements

The litigation filed by the family of the child who drowned in Ohio during a CPS school field trip was eventually settled before trial, with a gag order on the full amount. CPS never itemizes its own legal costs when it drags out these cases.

These cases are reported after Executive Session at each meeting of the Board of Education, but unless you know the case it's impossible to match the incident (which is often years earlier) with the settlement (even if the settlement is in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, as it usually is). As we've reported at Substance, since the Chicago Board of Education has voted to violate the Open Meetings Act and the Freedom of Information Act since 1995 (by refusing to release the minutes of their closed sessions since July 1, 1995), it's impossible for the public to get the information to monitor these things.

Often, when a family suffers a major loss and there is no criminal negligence, the civil damages is the only justice.

Sometimes, the liability is both criminal and civil.

One example we knew about was following the Moffat case.

CPS quietly settled with one of Moffat's victims for more than a half million dollars. But before that victim got her settlement, the case was dragged out for several years, at an additional cost to the taxpayers of several hundreds thousands dollars (for the CPS lawyers). The victim who won the settlement was never named in the public record, and in our reports in Substance we gave her a pseudonym (which didn't exist in any directory assistance, since we didn't want creeps bothering someone we didn't even know). In that case, the victim was called "Midgy Jonworth" in our Substance reports.

She called Substance a few months ago (the real person) to say, 20 years after the event which changed her life, that she is doing fine. That's partly because she won that civil case and had some money to help her straighten out her life.

As people who read Substance know, the State of Illinois removed Moffat from its directory of convicted sex offenders, and the national press has ignored the Moffat case whenever it covers sexual predators in the schools. That was part of the Moffat cover up, which lasted long after Moffat was convicted in criminal court on the basis of the testimony of five of his victims. From Education Week to The New York Times, however, the most prolific sexual predator in the history of public education in Chicago does not exist as part of that history.

Maybe it's because one of Moffat's lawyers 22 years ago was Anne Burke, who went on, based on her experience with Moffat's defense, to oversee the investigation of predation in the Catholic Church and is now a powerful justice on the Illinois Supreme Court. Like a lot in Chicago, power can cover up much.

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